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Most user authentication methods rely on a single verifier being stored at a central location within the information system. Such information storage 
presents a single point of compromise from a security perspective. If this system is compromised it poses a direct threat to users’ digital identities if the 
verifier can be extracted from the system. This paper proposes a distributed authentication environment in which there is no such single point of 
compromise. We propose an architecture that does not rely on a single verifier to authenticate users, but rather a distributed authentication architecture 
where several authentication servers are used to authenticate a user. We consider an authentication environment in which the user authentication process is 
distributed among independent servers. Each server independently performs its own authentication of the user, for example by asking the user to complete 
a challenge in order to prove his claim to a digital identity. The proposed architecture allows each server to use any authentication factor. We provide a 
security analysis of the proposed architecture and protocol, which shows they are secure against the attacks chosen in the analysis. 
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Arhitektura i protokol za raspodijeljenu autentifikaciju korisnika 
 
Izvorni znanstveni članak 
Većina metoda autentifikacije korisnika oslanjaju se na jedan verifikator koji se pohranjuje na središnjem mjestu unutar informacijskog sustava. Takva 
pohrana osjetljivih informacija predstavlja jedinstvenu točku ispada iz sigurnosne perspektive. Kompromitacija verifikatora jednog sustava predstavlja 
izravnu prijetnju korisnikovom digitalnom identitetu. U radu se predlaže raspodijeljeno okruženje za autentifikaciju u kojem ne postoji takva točka ispada. 
Rad opisuje arhitekturu koja omogućuje raspodijeljenu autentifikaciju korisnika u kojoj više autentifikacijskih poslužitelja sudjeluju u provjeri 
autentičnosti korisnika. Razmatra se autentifikacijsko okruženje u kojem se proces autentifikacije korisnika raspodjeljuje na više nezavisnih poslužitelja. 
Svaki poslužitelj samostalno obavlja autentifikaciju korisnika, na primjer tražeći od korisnika da odgovori na izazov kako bi dokazao da je vlasnik 
digitalnog identiteta. Predložena arhitektura omogućuje svakom poslužitelju da koristi drugi autentifikacijski faktor. Provedena je sigurnosna analiza 
predložene arhitekture i protokola, čime se dokazuje otpornost sustava od napada odabranih u analizi. 
 
Ključne riječi: autentifikacijski faktori; digitalni identitet; raspodijeljena autentifikacija korisnika; raspodijeljeni autentifikacijski protokol; 
raspodijeljena arhitektura za autentifikaciju  
 
 
1 Introduction  
 
User authentication presents one of the basic security 
requirements in information systems. Generally speaking, 
authentication can be described as a process in which a 
user offers some form of proof that he is the same user 
who registered the account. A proof of identity can be any 
piece of information that an authentication server accepts: 
something users have in their possession, something they 
know or something they are. These are called 
authentication factors [1]. Usually, in current practice, 
only one authentication server (AS) is in charge of storing 
the data used for authentication. When the user offers the 
requested proof of identity, the authentication server 
evaluates this proof and grants access to the user. This 
form of user authentication is centralized. For example, 
when a user tries to access his account on a typical web 
application he is prompted to enter a password. 
Traditionally, the web application holds the information 
about the user’s account and his password. When the user 
submits his password during log-in process, the 
application compares the stored password to the 
submitted password. If they match, the user is granted 
access to the application. In other words, all the 
information needed to authenticate the user is held on a 
single system. This makes such systems the single point 
of compromise for securing digital identities. In other 
words, in case an attacker gains access to the web 
application, he can extract enough information to 
compromise the user’s digital identity. Additionally, such 
systems often have multiple redundant copies of sensitive 
data [2]. By replicating confidential information across 
multiple servers, the risk of a successful attack becomes 
higher with every redundant copy [3].  
We conclude there are two weaknesses in the 
described authentication method. First, just one piece of 
information is not strong enough for all applications. 
Second, since many users tend to use the same secret 
information (e.g. password) for several servers [4], 
revealing their identity on one compromised server, 
threatens their accounts on other servers with the same 
secret information. We believe that such an infrastructure 
does not offer enough security and that an attacker can 
significantly compromise the digital identity of a 
legitimate user by gaining access to the system [5]. In 
some current implementations, the authentication server 
can be completely separated from the server running web 
applications. For example, single sign-on schemes [6] are 
based on this concept. However, even in these 
circumstances the same security risk is present if the 
authentication information is stored on one server. The 
only difference in this scenario would be a different attack 
vector than with web applications. 
The aim of this paper is to present a novel distributed 
user authentication architecture. From a security 
standpoint, in a distributed user authentication 
environment, there is no single point of compromise. The 
digital identities of all users of a system remain secure 
even in case one node is compromised. This is possible 
because no single node has enough information to fully 
authenticate a user. Instead, every node holds just a part 
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of the needed information. We describe the required 
authentication information in more detail later.  
The main concept in which distributed authentication 
differs from traditional authentication is that user 
authentication is no longer done on the system the user 
demands access to, or any other single server. Instead of 
authenticating the user locally, the system passes this duty 
to other independent systems and trusts their decision. 
Thus, the authentication process itself is distributed 
amongst two or more independent systems. 
 
1.1 Review of distributed authentication protocols  
 
 The idea of distributed authentication is not new. 
There has been some research on authentication in a 
distributed manner (e.g., Kerberos [7]), as well as the 
combination of authentication and authorization in 
distributed systems (e.g., Keynote [8]). Distributed 
authentication is commonly associated with single sign-on 
schemes [6] or federated identity [9]. In this paper, we 
consider distributed authentication to be a process in 
which a user's claim to a digital identity is verified by two 
or more independent systems.  
The research in [8] describes a distributed 
authentication model in which a single secure server is 
used to store secret information while other nodes carry 
out the processing needed to authenticate a user. An 
important benefit of this authentication model is that it 
requires no key management since the processing nodes 
do not handle secret data. There are many issues with 
achieving consistency of replicated private keys as well as 
achieving their secure distribution [10]. The model in [8] 
reduces secure server load compared to systems that run 
asymmetric crypto algorithms on a single server. The 
model is based on the SASC (Server-Aided Secret 
Computation) protocol, which enables a client to use the 
computing power of a server without revealing its secret 
information. Although this model reduces the risk of 
exposing the authentication server’s private key, its 
performance is low compared to the conventional 
approaches where each node has a private key and is 
trusted by the secure server. This model strengthens the 
security of authentication systems based on public key 
cryptography in that it bypasses the need for key 
management in distributed authentication systems. 
However, the model is only suitable for public key based 
user authentication. Also, the risk of stolen identity is still 
present in case where the secure server is compromised.  
The research in [11] introduces a new multi-server 
authentication scheme. The scheme is based on a 
registration centre, an authentication server and a smart 
card. A user has to register a digital identity with the 
registration centre, which then generates a set of 
parameters and stores them both locally and on a smart 
card. The smart cards are then delivered to the user via a 
secure channel. When a user wishes to authenticate with 
another server, he uses his smart card to compute an 
authentication message. The authentication server 
communicates with the registration centre to verify the 
validity of the user’s authentication message and grants 
access to the user. This way the secret data is not stored in 
a central location, but is distributed across an array of 
smart cards. However, the cost and complexity of 
implementing and maintaining such a scheme may be too 
large for some systems.  
Single sign-on has become increasingly popular, 
because of the increasing number of Internet services an 
average user uses in a day. The idea behind single sign-on 
scheme is that there is a single authentication server, 
which is used to authenticate the user for multiple 
services. Single sign-on schemes have an inherent flaw. 
They assume a service provider will trust a single third 
party system. The work under [12] tries to address this 
issue by distributing the authentication server on n 
different servers and using threshold cryptography. The 
scheme is based on sharing pieces of the authentication 
server’s private key across a number of servers. This is 
achieved using a (t, n) threshold scheme with which the 
private key is split into n partial keys. In order for the 
authentication response to be valid, at least t servers have 
to sign it with their partial key. After at least t servers sign 
the response, the message appears to be signed by the 
authentication server’s private key. This scheme aims to 
increase the level of security for the central authentication 
server. By dividing the key using a (t, n) threshold scheme 
the compromise of a single authentication server will not 
result in a compromise of the private key. Instead, an 
attacker would have to compromise at least t 
authentication servers. The downside of this scheme is 
that it still uses the classic username and password to 
authenticate users. Such an approach makes the method 
vulnerable to password stealing attacks. As a response to 
this, [12] suggests using two-factor authentication. Each 
user would have a unique USB device for additional 
authentication purposes. Such an approach makes this 
scheme complex and raises the overall cost of 
implementation and maintenance.  
We conclude that existing distributed authentication 
methods only use predefined authentication factors and do 
not allow a combination of more than one factor. 
Therefore, any change in the authentication factor 
requires additional adaptation.  
 
2 Research to define a distributed authentication 
architecture and protocol 
 
We hypothesize that by using distributed 
authentication schemes for the very process of 
authenticating users, the security of digital identities can 
be enhanced. At the same time, we argue that a distributed 
authentication scheme should be cost efficient and easy to 
implement. This is very important from practical point of 
view because, as stated in [11], the marginal security 
benefits of any proposed mechanism may be outweighed 
by the complexity of implementing it, making it unusable 
in real word scenarios. 
In this paper, we propose a new authentication 
scheme based on distributing the authentication process 
on more servers. The difference of our proposal from 
existing research is that we consider a distributed 
authentication environment with multiple nodes, in which 
each node holds some independent piece of information 
about the user that wishes to authenticate. The 
independent pieces of information are not bound together 
in any way (such as with threshold secret sharing). 
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The contribution of the proposed architecture is that 
the user’s digital identity remains secure even in the case 
one or more of the servers are compromised. This is 
achieved by using an authentication method in which the 
authentication information is neither stored on the server 
the user wishes to access nor on any other single 
authentication server. Instead, based on the requirements 
described in [13], the authentication server consults with 
other, mutually independent, nodes (servers) that hold 
information relating to the user’s digital identity. Each 
node holds just a piece of information about the user who 
wishes to authenticate. A user is considered authenticated 
only when a predefined number of nodes confirm the 
user's responses. Such an approach also aligns with the 
research in [14], which proposes a user authentication 
method based on vouching. Although that research is 
based on the premise that one user validates another’s 
claim to a digital identity, the same principle may be 
applied in an environment where a claim is verified by 
one or more independent systems. Our contribution in this 
paper is focused on creating a protocol that enables secure 
authentication in such a distributed environment. One of 
the key benefits of the proposed authentication 
architecture is that it does not impose a specific 
authentication factor. Instead, each AS can choose to 
generate challenges based on the factor of their choosing. 
This is a similar process to multimodal biometric systems 
[15] in which two or more biometrics are used to 
determine the authenticity of the user. The architecture 
itself does not rely on cryptographic one-way functions to 
secure user credentials, as such solutions have been 
compromised in some cases [16]. 
We define the terminology necessary for describing 
the proposed authentication architecture.  
 
− Client – a user that wishes to gain access to a specific 
service on an Application server 
− Client ID – an identifier that is used to associate the 
challenges with the client. The identifier is used to 
identify a client in each DAS and the FAS 
− Authentication session – defines a set of steps and 
servers responsible for authenticating a user once 
− Application server (AS) - the node that the client 
wishes to gain access to and relies on the FAS to 
authenticate the user 
− Front-end Authentication Server (FAS) – the 
primary node contacted by the application server, 
whose role is to communicate with the user during 
authentication. This node will forward the 
authentication challenges from the DAS servers to 
the user, and user's  responses to the DAS servers as 
well as make final decision whether to authenticate 
the user or not based on decisions from the DAS 
servers 
− Distributed Authentication Server (DAS) – the 
node that creates challenges for the user and verifies 
his answers 
− DAS challenge – a question posed to the client in 
order to authenticate them, 
− Manifest – a common data structure used to carry 
relevant information between FAS and DAS during 
an authentication session. The Manifest contains 
challenges presented by the individual DAS servers 
and answers given by the client. 
 
2.1  Distributed authentication protocol 
 
 The protocol describes the behaviour of the DAS, the 
behaviour of the FAS, and the content of the Manifest. 
The protocol is independent from the challenge that the 
DAS generates for a user. Defining a particular 
authentication challenge is beyond the scope of this paper. 
In general, the challenge can be anything the DAS deems 
appropriate for the current user, using any authentication 
factor: biometrics, hardware tokens or any other 
combination thereof. The proposed authentication 
protocol consists of three cycles. During the first cycle the 
FAS gathers a number of challenges from the available 
DAS servers. During the second cycle the challenges are 
presented to the client and the client answers them. 
During the third cycle the answers are evaluated by the 
DAS servers that presented the challenge. The first and 
third cycles are similar. The only difference between them 
is that during the third cycle the Manifest contains 
answers instead of challenges. The following steps 
describe the authentication protocol. Tab. 1 and Fig. 1 
explain the steps in more detail. 
 
Table 1 Symbol explanation 
Symbol Explanation 
IDCLIENT The client identifier (username or other) 
ENV The envelope 
ENVSIG The envelope signature 
DWN The drawer for the Nth DAS 
SDWDASN Signature of the initialized drawer for the Nth 
DAS 
EDWDASN Encrypted initialized drawer for the Nth DAS 
PRX Private key operation (signature generation) 
using X’s private key 
PUX Public key operation (encryption) using X’s 
public key 
CHDASN Challenge from the Nth DAS 
DWCDASN The drawer for the Nth DAS populated with a 
challenge for the user 
CHADASN The clients answer to the challenge of the Nth 
DAS 
DWAN The drawer for the Nth DAS populated with the 
clients answer 
SDWADASN Signature of the drawer for the Nth DAS 
populated with the client answers 
EDWADASN Encrypted empty drawer for the Nth DAS 
VOTEDASN The vote of the Nth DAS 
DWVDASN The drawer for the Nth DAS populated with its 
vote 
SDWVFASN Signature of the drawer for the Nth DAS 
populated with its vote 
EDWVFASN Encrypted drawer for the Nth DAS populated 
with its vote 
 
Step 1: Client  FAS:IDCLIENT 
The authentication session begins once the client 
initiates the authentication process with the FAS. Since 
the client is already registered with the FAS, prior to 
requesting access, the FAS knows which DAS servers can 
be used to authenticate this client. It then chooses at 
random a subset of the DAS servers capable of 
authenticating the client and compiles the manifest as 
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described in the previous chapters. The FAS populates the 
Envelope of the Manifest, creates the DAS Drawers, sets 
the DAS operation to "generate" and digitally signs the 
envelope with its private key and encrypts it using its 
public key. Also, each DAS drawer is encrypted with the 
DAS's public key and digitally signed by the FAS's 
private key. Encryption is used to preserve confidentiality 
of transferred data, while the digital signature ensures 
Drawer authenticity and non-repudiation. 
 
 
Figure 1Proposed authentication scheme 
 
Step 2: FAS  DASN: ENV, ENVSIG, SDWDASN, 
EDWDASN 
The DAS server decrypts its Drawer using its private 
key and checks the validity of the content with the FAS's 
public key. The DAS server then generates a challenge, or 
a number of challenges, for the client identified to the 
DAS server with the Client ID. Once done, the challenges 
are put within the Drawer and encrypted using the FAS's 
public key and signed using the DAS's private key. The 
DAS server then sends the Manifest to the next DAS 
server. If the next DAS does not respond, it will try to 
connect to the following DAS in the list, and so on until it 
finds a DAS that responds. In case there are no remaining 
DAS servers in the list or in case none of the DAS servers 
responds, the Manifest is returned to the FAS. 
Step 3: DASN FAS: ENV, ENVSIG, SDWFASN, 
EDWFASN 
The FAS checks the envelope validity and the 
validity of the content in all DAS Drawers. The validity 
check is done by verifying the signatures of the Drawers 
and the Envelope, and decrypting them. If a decrypted 
Drawer is not valid it means there was a fault with the 
corresponding DAS server. Once the validity of the 
content is verified, the FAS checks if the required number 
of DAS servers has generated the necessary challenges. In 
case this condition is not met, the FAS server has to 
repeat the above process again with other DAS servers 
until the required number is met.  
Step 4: FAS  Client: CHDASN 
The FAS forwards the challenges to the client. This 
can be done, one by one, sending next challenge only 
after the response to the previous one has been sent by the 
client, or in a batch, and then receiving responses in a 
batch, as well. 
Step 5: Client  FAS: CHADASN 
The client sends their answers to the FAS, one by 
one, or in a batch.  
Step 6: FAS  DASN: ENV, ENVSIG, SDWADASN, 
EDWADASN 
The FAS populates DASs’ Drawers with the client’s 
answers and by setting the DAS operation to verify. Like 
in the first cycle, the Manifest is sent to the first DAS in 
the list. The DAS verifies the signature of its drawers and 
checks the client’s answers. Based on the answer, the 
DAS makes a decision on the authenticity of the client 
and places its vote in its drawer and encrypts it using the 
FAS public key.  
Step 7: DASN FAS: ENV, ENVSIG, SDWVFASN, 
EDWVFASN 
Once the Manifest returns, the Drawers and Envelope 
are verified like in the first cycle. If the required number 
of DAS servers has not voted, the authentication session 
starts again to fill the missing number of DAS servers 
(previous votes are not forgotten). Once all the necessary 
DAS servers have voted, the votes are evaluated and the 
decision is made if access will be granted to the client. 
 
2.2  Client registration 
 
A client has to register once with the FAS, prior to 
initiating an authentication request. During the 
registration process, the client registers a set of DAS 
servers he wishes to use for authentication. As presented 
in [17], there are many problems with creating and 
maintaining a global user identity. Thus, for each DAS 
the client must provide his ID known to a specific DAS, 
with which this DAS can generate a challenge for that 
client.  
The client may choose any set of DAS servers he is 
registered with to authenticate him. However, from user 
proposed set, a subset is created consisting of DAS 
servers with which the FAS server has previously 
established relationship and has exchanged their public 
keys. This mode of operation was chosen as it may be 
more cost effective for a FAS server to only communicate 
with a set of DAS servers with which it has already 
established a trusted connection, rather than trying to 
establish relationship each time a user proposed some new 
DAS. 
 
2.3  Modes of operation 
 
During execution, the proposed protocol offers two 
types of data exchange modes to choose from. We call 
them: centralized polling and round robin mode. During 
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centralized polling mode, the FAS sequentially initiates a 
connection with each DAS separately. This means that the 
list of next DAS servers is always empty. In round robin 
mode, the FAS sends the Manifest to the first DAS which 
responds (e.g. DAS1). Upon generating the challenges, 
the first DAS sends the Manifest to the next DAS on the 
list that responds, and so on. The last DAS server sends 
the Manifest Back to the FAS.  
Such a protocol allows for configurable levels of fault 
tolerance and FAS load optimization during 
communication. The round robin mode offers higher 
performance but lower fault tolerance, while the 
centralized poling mode achieves higher fault tolerance 
but has lower performance. Distributing a process among 
multiple servers is a common method for removing 
performance bottlenecks in user authentication [7]. 
Each FAS can define its own set of rules regarding its 
interaction with the DAS servers which may depend on 
the required fault tolerance and performance 
characteristics. We also note that the proposed 
architecture has no single point of compromise. Also, the 
same DAS can be used in two different modes by two 
different FAS servers. Since the FAS server has no 
verifiers, its compromise cannot lead to a compromise of 
the user’s digital identity. 
 
2.4  Manifest structure and initialization 
 
 When the FAS receives the client’s authentication 
request it instantiates a Manifest. Based on the desired 
mode of operation, the Manifest will be passed to one or 
more DAS servers randomly chosen from the client’s list 
and then be sent back to the FAS. For such a dynamic 
communication model to work we choose to define a 
common data structure that will be used for exchanging 
data between the FAS and the DAS servers during the 
authentication session. As described previously, we call 
this structure the Manifest. In order for the 
communication protocol to work as described, the 
Manifest has to have the structure and content as shown in 
Fig. 2. 
 In order for the FAS to be sure that the Manifest was 
not tampered with during communication, it has to store 
some metadata about the authentication session. For this 
reason we introduce an Envelope element within the 
Manifest. The Envelope holds the client’s ID on the FAS 
and the required number of DAS servers to authenticate 
the client. This data is necessary for the FAS to be 
stateless. Additionally, the Envelope holds a hashed list of 
all DAS servers that were supposed to be used in the 
authentication session. For each DAS server that is to be 
used during an authentication session, certain information 
has to be passed between the FAS and the DAS server. 
This data needs to be kept securely since it includes the 
challenges that will authenticate the users and the DAS 
evaluation of the client’s responses. In order to prevent 
tampering with this information, each DAS shares a secret 
container with the FAS. We call this container a DAS 
Drawer and it is encrypted and digitally signed in order to 
keep integrity and confidentiality. Encryption and digital 
signatures are done using the RSA algorithm. Each DAS 
Drawer holds that DAS’s ID of the client wishing to 
authenticate, the FAS return address, and the requested 
DAS operation. The DAS operation specifies which 
action the DAS server should perform: challenge 
generation or answer verification. Thus, the Drawer has a 
list of challenges and a field for the DAS's vote. 
Additionally, the Drawer holds a list of DAS servers that 
are next in line. Based on the chosen mode of operation, 
the Drawer is populated with the appropriate number of 
DAS servers. 
 The DAS vote is implemented as a Boolean variable. 
This is also similar to biometric authentication in which a 
user's biometric trait is measured and compared to a 
stored template [18]. Additionally, we propose that each 
DAS server should have its own internal scale based on 
which it will decide if a user is authentic or not. The final 
DAS votes are summed up and evaluated by the FAS. If 
all the votes (or a specific number of votes as suggested in 
[14]) are positive, the user is authenticated. 
In order for a DAS to know how to access its drawer, a 
separate element is introduced to the Manifest, the 
Address book. Its purpose is to hold a list of all DAS 
drawers in the Manifest and their relative location within 
it. By accessing the Address book, a DAS can 
immediately retrieve its Drawer from the Manifest and 
attempt to decrypt it using its private key. In order to keep 
an attacker from identifying which DAS servers are used 
for a specific Client, DAS names are hashed. 
 
 
Figure 2 Manifest structure 
 
2.5  Usability  
 
As explained in [19], usability is a key component of 
each authentication system. As explained in the previous 
sections, the proposed system does not impose any new 
requirements on the client except the need for providing 
more than one credential during authentication. From a 
client’s perspective, the system integrates transparently 
with existing authentication schemes and the complexities 
of the underlying mechanisms are not evident to the 
client. From the application server perspective, 
implementing the proposed authentication protocol is the 
same as implementing any single sign-on scheme. 
Therefore, we argue that the proposed system 
leverages the usability of existing authentication methods 
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and is thus as usable as the chosen authentication methods 
and factors. 
 
3 Security analysis  
 
The most important benefit of this architecture is its 
resistance to cyber attacks. In the following sections we 
show that an attacker would have to compromise all DAS 
servers involved in the current authentication session in 
order to compromise a digital identity. Additionally, even 
if an attacker manages to compromise all DAS servers 
used to authenticate one user, he is unable to steal the 
digital identity of another user that uses different DAS 
servers to authenticate with the same FAS. Also, by 
compromising the FAS, an attacker does not gain access 
to a user’s digital identity since it is not stored on the 
FAS.  
The proposed security measures are based on public 
key cryptography [20]. Traditionally, public key 
cryptography is used to establish a session key used to 
encrypt data with a symmetric algorithm. Such an 
approach is used because symmetric algorithms are faster 
than asymmetric ones. In the proposed protocol we only 
use asymmetric algorithms. Thus, no session key is 
established. Although they have lower performance, we 
argue that the use of asymmetric algorithms is not a 
problem for the proposed environment. The reason for 
this is twofold. First, the amount of data that is encrypted 
and decrypted is smaller than in environments that 
establish session keys (e.g. Web sites with HTTPS). 
Secondly, advances in running asymmetric algorithms in 
multithreaded environments [21] have been made. Also, 
the use of elliptic curve algorithms may additionally 
increase performance as described in [22].  
This protocol assumes that each DAS has its own pair 
of private and public keys and that the FAS and the DAS 
servers have exchanged their public keys prior to the 
authentication session. This needs to be done only once 
between each FAS – DAS pair and will remain valid 
forever, or until one member of the pair changes its 
public-private key. 
 
3.1  Malicious DAS 
 
A malicious DAS attack is when one or more servers 
are corrupted or in collusion with an adversary. If a 
malicious DAS tries to change the data entered by a 
legitimate DAS server, the FAS will see that the Manifest 
was tampered with based on the digital signature in the 
envelope. Thus, tampering with the content will cause the 
authentication session to be void, and would have to be 
restarted. Even if a malicious DAS changes the entire 
Manifest content, it cannot generate a valid digital 
signature for a legitimate DAS server. When the FAS 
receives the populated Manifest it checks that all the 
signatures are valid. Based on this we conclude that a 
malicious DAS server cannot change the content of the 
Manifest since this will be detected. Passive attacks 
involving malicious DAS servers involve recording 
challenges and answers. During the first cycle of the 
protocol, the challenges are encrypted using FAS's public 
key. Thus, a malicious DAS cannot read the challenges as 
it does not know FAS's private key. 
3.2  Manifest interception and manipulation 
 
In the proposed protocol, a message can be 
intercepted by compromising the DAS or the FAS, or by 
compromising the underlying TCP/IP infrastructure (e.g. 
a router between two DAS servers). However, since the 
Manifest used for communication between the DAS 
servers and the FAS is secured using private key 
cryptography, by intercepting the Manifest the attacker 
can neither read its content nor falsify it. 
The communication between the client and the FAS 
may or may not be secured. Since users usually do not 
pay attention to certificates and server signatures [23], a 
man-in-the-middle attack is possible. As described in 
[23], an attacker may insert himself in a secured 
connection between the client and the server by using a 
forged certificate. An attacker creates a TLS/SSL 
connection with the client and the server. This way, the 
server and the client think they are communicating with 
each other and the attacker can intercept their data. 
Currently, there is no ideal solution to this problem as it is 
up to the users and their browsers to detect forged 
certificates.   
Another possible attack consists of replaying the 
positive votes from the DAS. If an attacker manages to 
record a successful authentication session and record the 
positive votes in the Manifest before it is sent to the FAS, 
the recorded messages may be sent again at a later time. 
For this reason we introduced a signed timestamp in the 
Manifest Envelope. This prevents the attacker from 
reusing a recorded session at a later time. Since the 
timestamp is generated and verified locally on the FAS, 
there is no need for clock synchronization amongst 
distributed systems. Another countermeasure is the fact 
that the FAS chooses the necessary DAS servers at 
random for each session. As described earlier, the DAS 
servers used for an authentication session are unknown 
until the FAS randomly chooses them during Manifest 
initialization.  
We conclude that no relevant or sensitive information 
about the authentication session or client's digital identity 
can be obtained by intercepting or manipulating the 
Manifest. 
 
3.3  Compromised FAS 
 
The FAS does not keep any secret client information 
in its storage. Thus, its information cannot be leveraged to 
directly compromise a digital identity. Additionally, a 
compromise of one FAS does not help compromise other 
FAS or DAS servers as they are independent systems. 
However, with a compromised FAS it is possible to 
intercept and decrypt the Manifest content, as well as 
DAS Drawers since it is encrypted for the FAS. Thus, a 
compromised FAS could be used to record legitimate 
client answers to challenges. Of course, this is only a 
problem if the challenges repeat over time. 
To prevent such an attack, we propose an additional 
security measure. Instead of encrypting the challenges 
with FAS's public key, a DAS can encrypt them using the 
Client's public key. Also, the Client would encrypt his 
answers with the DAS's public key. This way, the FAS 
would never know what the challenges and answers are 
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and could not use them. As described by [24], the main 
design issue in authentication schemes is the choice of 
cryptographic algorithms and the amount of trust placed 
on a third party. We conclude that a compromised FAS 
cannot be used to compromise a client's digital identity. 
 
4  Performance analysis of the proposed protocol 
 
The proposed protocol relies strongly on public key 
cryptography. Thus, its performance relies mainly on the 
performance of the chosen cryptographic algorithms. In 
this section we give a performance analysis based on the 
cryptographic operations that take place in an 
authentication session. The notation Tenc, Tdec and Tsig 
denotes the time complexity of the encryption function, 
the decryption function and the digital signature function 
(both signature verification and generation), respectively. 
 
4.1  Analytical approach   
 
The proposed protocol has three major operations that 
are computationally intensive and that make use of 
cryptographic functions: 
− Manifest initialization: the FAS has to initialize the 
Manifest before sending it to a DAS. The 
initialization occurs both times the FAS forwards the 
Manifest to a DAS (when soliciting challenges from 
DASs' and forwarding Client responses), 
− Manifest check: FAS checks the integrity of the 
Manifest,  
− DAS actions: DAS servers when they check the 
validity of their drawer and populate the manifest 
with their challenges 
 
Tab. 2 describes the performance cost based on the 
number of cryptographic operations per session. Since 
this depends on the number of DAS server involved in an 
authentication session, we use the notation N to denote the 
number of DAS servers used. 
 
Table 2 Cryptographic operations used 
 Round robin Centralized polling 
Tsig 6 + 2 * N 2 + 6 * N 
Tenc 4 + 2 * N 2 + 4 * N 
Tdec 4 + 2 * N 2 + 4 * N 
 
 We implemented and tested the proposed protocol 
and architecture and measured their performance. Our 
performance analysis shows that average time for 
encryption and decryption a message of 10000 characters 
in memory using the RSA algorithm with key size of 512 
bits is 110 milliseconds, and 70 milliseconds respectively. 
It was tested on a 3.20 GHz AMD Phenom II X6 CPU PC 
with 6.00 GB of RAM.  The results we measured are 
similar to those in [25]. The average time for signature 
generation and verification using the RSA algorithm is 10 
milliseconds. Thus, the average time of Tsig is 20 
milliseconds. Our measurements are equal to those in 
[26]. Based on these average values we estimate the total 
time cost of the authentication protocol with regard to the 
number of DAS server (N) involved. Tab. 4 presents the 
time estimate for the first Cycle of the protocol in Round 
robin and Centralized polling mode. The time estimate for 
Cycle 3 is the same. We note that Centralized polling has 
lower performance, but offers increased security as 
described in previous chapters. 
 
4.2  Practical approach 
 
 We tested the proposed architecture and protocol in a 
laboratory environment and measured the following 
results as described in Tab. 3. We implemented the 
system using the Java programming language and 
BouncyCastle library as the provider for the 
cryptographic functions. We choose this provider as it is 
commonly used to provide cryptographic functions like in 
existing research [27], [28], [29], [30]. As can be seen in 
Fig. 4, the implementation achieves greater performance 
than the analytical estimation when up to 10 DAS servers 
are used. This performance boost can be explained by the 
effect of the Java Just-in-Time (JIT) Compiler as 
described in [31] and [32].We note that for 15 and more 
DAS servers, the overall execution time increases 
exponentially. This is due to the changes in Manifest size 
over time. As shown in Table 3, Table 4 and Figure 3, in 
round robin mode the Manifest size grows with the 
number of DAS servers. Also, our laboratory cluster 
cannot efficiently manage more than 10 nodes at a time 
due to limitations of virtualized environments. However, 
we propose that 10 DAS servers are enough for most use 
cases. As the user has to answer 10 or more challenges 
from 10 different DAS servers, usability becomes an 
issue. 
 
Table 3 Time estimation for one cycle of Round robin mode 
N Tsig (ms) Tenc (ms) Tdec (ms) TOTAL (sec) 
2 100 440 280 0,82 
3 120 550 350 1,02 
4 140 660 420 1,22 
5 160 770 490 1,42 
10 260 1320 840 2,42 
15 360 1870 1190 3,42 
 
Table 4 Time estimation for one cycle of Centralized polling mode 
N Tsig (ms) Tenc (ms) Tdec (ms) TOTAL (sec) 
2 140 550 350 1,04 
3 200 770 490 1,46 
4 260 990 630 1,88 
5 320 1210 770 2,3 
10 620 2310 1470 4,4 
15 920 3410 2170 6,5 
 
Based on the performance results, we stipulate that 
the overall time spent on cryptographic operations is 
lower than the time spent by the user to issue a response 
to the challenges presented. Additionally, the time could 
be lower by using elliptic curve algorithms [33]. The 
centralized polling mode could be further optimized if the 
challenges are presented to the user as they are received 
by the FAS. While the user is answering the challenge of 
the first DAS, the FAS asks the second DAS to provide a 
challenge, thus lowering the overall time the user is idle. 
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Figure 3 Manifest size comparison 
 
 
Figure 4 Performance comparison 
 
5  Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we proposed a new distributed user 
authentication architecture and protocol that allows a user 
to be authenticated in a distributed manner. We also 
analysed potential security issues and proposed 
countermeasures to prevent them from compromising a 
digital identity. The analysis has shown that the proposed 
distributed authentication architecture offers considerably 
more security than current authentication methods. 
Specifically, the architecture prevents a compromise of a 
digital identity when a single server is compromised. A 
key benefit of the proposed authentication architecture is 
that it does not impose a specific authentication factor. 
Instead, each DAS can use any authentication factor 
which is appropriate for the system. We suggest that this 
flexibility makes the proposed architecture and protocol 
impervious to change. 
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